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research-log

Certificate of Authenticity Tampering in Aerospace 3PL Chain

Certificate of Authenticity Tampering in Aerospace 3PL Chain: Recreation of a Real Provenance Spoof, Simulated for Public Disclosure

Project Code: SAF-2874

Type: Secure Supply Chain Mechanism Audit

In August 2024, I was hired by a Tier 1 aerospace parts supplier to examine their certificate validation system for serialized titanium material, to recreate a known exploit in the Boeing-AirBus titanium supply chain exploited in 2023, and to prepare a report on the security weakness and it's remediation. For disclosure, I’ve scrubbed all production identifiers and randomized the data inputs, but left the trust boundaries and failure surfaces intact.

The core logic:

function addCertificate(uint256 tokenId, bytes32 coahash) public {
    certificates[tokenId] = coahash;
}

This contract allows any msg.sender to submit a certificate hash without checking role, registry, or issuer identity. There’s no modifier like onlyAdmin or onlyIssuer, so the function can be called by any address.

There’s also no check that the tokenId exists, has been registered, or is part of a valid batch. Without something like:

require(_exists(tokenId), "Invalid tokenId");

the system accepts inputs tied to unverified or invented IDs.

This design permits unintended behavior: a sender could upload a hash for a shipment not yet registered, or overwrite an existing certificate without visibility.

Best practices for these systems include:

1. Role Enforcement
   

   modifier onlyAuthorizedIssuer() {
       require(authorizedIssuers[msg.sender], "Unauthorized");
       _;

2. Token Verification
   

   require(_exists(tokenId), "Invalid tokenId");

3. Immutability
   

   require(certificates[tokenId] == bytes32(0), "Certificate already exists");

4. Off-Chain Signatures
   To bridge blockchain events with business workflows, a signature check enables verification of origin while allowing stakeholders to audit inputs via tools like Power BI.

These improvements align contract logic with operational safeguards. Systems that handle serialized, high-integrity inventory need both verifiable records and role-bound write controls. This simulation clarified how gaps at the smart contract layer create lasting vulnerability.

Technical Artifacts, released as approved

• attack-overview.md: Red team report on spoof injection. X
• patch-notes.md: Hardened contract changes and logic gates. X
• threat-model.md: STRIDE-based security review. X
• VulnProvenance.sol: Source code for simulation. [GitHub Approved]
• README.md: Full SDLC and artifact index. X

All artifacts are available in the GitHub repository .